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  The command party traveled some distance down the road before fire came its way, either directed fire or spent bullets from the fight in progress on the other side.30 As the command party moved up the road alongside the inlet, it split into two or more parts. Faith was in front with a small group. Bigger and MacLean with a few others were some distance behind Faith. It was at this time, Bigger said, that "we observed a column of troops approaching the perimeter of the 31st from the south along the road. Col. MacLean was at first overjoyed for he felt that that was the remainder of his regimental combat team he had been expecting [and Battalion, 31st Infantry]."31 Bigger said that the column coming from the south was approaching but had not yet reached the western end of the 3rd Battalion perimeter. There was firing from this group toward the perimeter, and there was return fire from the edge of the perimeter toward the marching column. Mac Lean looked at the scene for a moment and then shouted, "Those are my boys!" He thought that the column of men marching east toward the perimeter was the vanguard of his and Battalion, which he had been expecting since the 27th. His immediate impulse was to get across the inlet to stop the firing, in which his two battalions, he thought, would cripple each other.

  MacLean turned to Bigger and said, "Here, take this order and give it to Faith." He rapidly delivered an oral order to Bigger that generally followed the usual five-point field order. He then turned and strode out onto the ice of the inlet, headed for the other side. Bigger watched. After MacLean got some distance out on the ice, Bigger could see that men on the other side were firing at him and saw him fall several times, but each time MacLean got up and continued on. Bigger could not tell whether MacLean was hit each time he fell or whether he was slipping on the ice. As MacLean neared the other bank, Bigger could see Chinese soldiers come out to the edge of the ice, where they took hold of MacLean and pulled him to the brush-covered ground. They led him up the bank and onto the road and then away westward. That was the last Bigger could see of MacLean as the party went out of view. Bigger said that the incident took place about half a mile west of the bridge, about halfway between the turn of the road eastward along the inlet and the bridge.32

  Concerning the nature of the oral order MacLean gave to him, Bigger wrote in answer to a question from me: "Col MacLean's oral order to me just prior to his striking out across the ice consisted in general of what he thought the enemy situation was, where our bn should tie in with the 31st and the fact that he thought the relief column was in sight. He wanted to secure the high ground around the perimeter of the location of the 31st and 57th FA. His CP was to be in the remains of a house and that is where Faith was to meet him when the 1/32 entered the perimeter."33

  Bigger's sketch map of MacLean's course across the Inlet shows him proceeding almost straight south from his point of departure until he reached one of the many marshy, brush-covered islands near the south side of the inlet. Then his course veered sharply southwest over marshy but frozen ground to the bank of the inlet. The point where he reached the bank was west of and outside the 3rd Battalion perimeter and was held by the Chinese.

  Others saw MacLean cross the frozen inlet and saw him fall to the ice several times when Chinese fire from the south bank hit him. Faith, Jones, and Curtis saw the crossing in full or in part. Each saw him from a different vantage point along the inlet. All of them have left accounts that verify Bigger's more detailed version. Faith said that he saw MacLean fall four times. Curtis saw him fall twice in the latter part of the crossing. Faith gave his account to General Barr when the latter visited the inlet perimeter on the 3oth, the day after the event, and subsequently General Barr included the account in a letter to Mrs. Don C. Faith, Jr.

  Later in the morning, after he had crossed the inlet, Faith ordered a search for MacLean. C Company made the search since it was to take over the shore of the inlet as its sector in the new perimeter organized that afternoon. It reported that it found no trace of MacLean. The search necessarily was made in the low ground along the inlet and did not include the CCF route of withdrawal or the high ground behind the perimeter, all of which was held by the Chinese.

  Inquiry disclosed that no one in the 3rd Battalion or the 57th Field Artillery had seen MacLean or witnessed his capture. This is not surprising when one realizes that the incident took place outside their perimeter, that there was much brush and low scrub along the shore of the inlet where the Chinese captured MacLean, that they had just undergone an ordeal for survival during the night, and that at the western end of the perimeter the men were still in their holes fighting off the Chinese at dawn. Also, visibility was not good from their position to the area where MacLean was captured. The topography along the edge of the inlet there was masked by rough, broken ground above the bank and was screened from much of the perimeter by folds of ground and the high weeds and brush lining the inlet at that point.34 The Chinese soldiers who captured MacLean quickly left the area soon after daybreak.

  Colonel MacLean's fate was unknown until an American prisoner released by the Chinese said that in early December, 195o he had been a prisoner along with many others, including MacLean, who were being moved north from the Chosin Reservoir to a prison camp. He said that the Americans cared for and helped the wounded colonel all they could but that he died of his wounds on the fourth day of the journey. His comrades buried MacLean in a grave alongside the road.35 Eight months after his disappearance Colonel MacLean was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his personal heroism and leadership of troops under his command November 2729, 1950.36

  What Colonel MacLean might have done with his troops if he had been allowed another day or two to bring them together cannot be known. If he had not disappeared into the enemy's hands, he might have withdrawn them or parts of them successfully, though with heavy casualties, to Hagaru-ri, as the Marines did with their regiments cut off at Yudam-ni. At least we know that this Army officer, the highest-ranking combat leader of the US Armed Forces to lose his life in enemy action in northeast Korea, would have set a personal example as a hard-driving, courageous leader, inspiring his officers and men to their best effort.

  Captain Stamford, the FAC, remained on the north side of the inlet until shortly after noon, directing Corsair strikes to help the trucks cross the bridge. He then crossed with his radio jeep and TACP. He wrote two months later, "The dead were everywhere when we joined them." He also said that he saw American soldiers dead in their sleeping bags. Captain Bigger confirmed that "in the 31st Infantry and 57th FA ... many men were killed by the Chinese as they (US soldiers) slept in the bedrolls."37

  Stamford needed to know the condition of the 3rd Battalion's TACP and on inquiry learned that Lieutenant Johnson, USAF, the FAC, had been killed and his radio equipment wrecked. Thus the full burden of close air support for the combined forces fell on Stamford and his TACP. He wrote that he

  looked for a place to sit and relax while I ate this rare repast [a can of rations]. A few feet away there were two CCF corpses. One was in a position to afford me a place to sit. The other was in a kneeling position, sitting on his heels and resting on his elbows. The top of his head had evidently been removed the night before while fighting for possession of the perimeter. As he froze, his brain expanded and rose up out of cranium until it looked like a piece of pink coral on a South Pacific reef. The hoar frost that fell during the early morning hours covered the top of his brain and sparkled in the sunlight. Too hungry to wait for a collecting detail to remove these corpses from my area, I opened the can of rations and using the "coral" as a centerpiece I sat down on the other and wolfed down my rations.38

  Major Robbins tells of his first minutes in the perimeter after floorboarding the accelerator of his jeep when he crossed the bridge. He said: "I set out for the 3rd Battalion CF to find Colonel Reilly propped on a stretcher with a bullet hole through his leg and grenade splinters lightly sprinkled in his arm and shoulder. He was in good spirits and chatted with me about the situation in general. Colonel Faith came in at this time and wen
t into immediate conference with Reilly as they laid plans to consolidate the two battalions and the field artillery, gathered in a tight circle of defense."

  Robbins searched out Capt. Bob McClay, the 3rd Battalion adjutant, to learn about the beating the perimeter had taken from the Chinese the night before. He commented: "One had only to look about as he told the story to confirm everything he said. Dead and wounded GIs lay in and around the Korean mud house that served as a CP and just a few yards beyond I counted twenty dead Chinese in their now familiar quilted jackets and tennis shoes. In fact they were strewn throughout the area giving evidence of their penetration into the very foxholes of the beleaguered battalion and its command post."39

  Pausing at the aid station, Robbins found Captain Adams, the 3rd Battalion S-4, dying of wounds, and Lieutenant Dill, executive officer of M Company, apparently mortally wounded. Captain Henry Wamble, of the Medical Company, an old friend, lay with a bullet through his lungs, able to speak only in a whisper. None reached Hagaru-ri. Robbins took over Colonel MacLean's jeep and crew and dug a cavelike hole in the side of a small embankment with an overhead cover of logs. He then went in search of Faith and Miller. After Faith had his conference with Reilly, he had assumed command of all troops in the perimeter. When Robbins found Faith, the latter appointed him "Task Force S-4."4°

  Faith, with Miller and Curtis, spent the rest of the morning, in Curtis's words, "trying to find out what was left of Companies I and K of the 31st (there was no Co. L left) -tying them in with our Cos A, B, C to form a perimeter."41

  During the morning Lieutenant Mortrude held his two platoons of C Company in safety behind the west side of the causeway after he met Faith at the inlet. He waited there until he received instructions to go into the C Company line in the new perimeter. Mortrude describes his own 3rd Platoon role:

  Our platoon was deployed to defend the northwest portion of the task force perimeter blocking the road approach from the southwest with our right flank on the southern bank of the frozen arm of the reservoir. We spent the remainder of [the day] preparing our platoon positions with emphasis on the road leading into us along the reservoir from the southwest. Also, I directed that the many Chinese dead within and in front of our area be searched for grenades to be salvaged and then the bodies be collected together to prevent confusion in any further night attacks. In addition to salvaging many "potato masher" grenades, we also acquired a healthy respect for the effects of our 4o mm automatic weapons fire which had apparently destroyed this unit the night before our withdrawal to the area. In anticipation of a cold night, I even salvaged a greatcoat from an unusually large enemy KIA. This supplemental item fit quite comfortably, if not stylishly, beneath my parka, but it was to be a source of considerable concern to me.42

  Mortrude's position was on the north side of the road along the inlet, opposite A Company, and he had a recoilless rifle on the southeast shoulder of the road where A and C Company boundaries met. A Company had responsibility for the roadblock, but Mortrude's platoon shared it during the fighting of the next two days and nights. From his northwestern platoon boundary Mortrude's position "extended northeast down to and along the ice of the reservoir." The rest of C Company extended the line toward the causeway and bridge.

  In forming a new perimeter, Faith tried to include some high ground on the south as part of A and B companies' side of the perimeter. They failed in their efforts during the afternoon to wrest it from the Chinese. So, in the end, Faith had to settle for a very restricted, unsatisfactory perimeter, all of it dominated by higher terrain.43

  In addition to the high ridge rising to its crest at Hill 1456, south of the perimeter, long finger ridges from that peak came down on both the east and the west sides to the railroad, the road, and the shore of the inlet. The high ground formed roughly a flat U around the restricted American perimeter, with the open side of the U pointed north at the shore of the inlet.

  The eastern spur ridge from Hill 1456 descended abruptly to the inlet about 50o yards east of the causeway and bridge, ending in a knob named Hill 1i10. Its crest was 390 feet above the Pungnyuri-gang, and it dominated the eastern end of the perimeter.

  At the other, western, end of the perimeter a spur ridge from Hill 1456 dominated the low ground there. This ridge spread out just above the inlet in a wide knob, named Hill 1250. Its steep northern slope dropped sharply to the edge of the reservoir. The narrow-gauge railroad had been cut into its lower slope to make the turn south. Hill 1250 rose nearly 530 feet above the level of the inlet and the reservoir, dominating the western side of the perimeter.44

  Lieutenant Colonel Faith organized the units in the perimeter into a unified command that thereafter was informally called "Task Force Faith" but did not include Captain Drake's 31st Tank Company or the 31st Rear CP at Hudong-ni. This reorganized perimeter had the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Infantry on the east and the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry on the north, west, and south flanks, with the heavy mortars, the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 15th antiaircraft guns in the center.45

  MAP 9. Task Force Faith's perimeter at the inlet.

  Faith's reorganized perimeter departed little in dimensions and physical features from the original perimeter of the 3rd Battalion. The ground on the south side of the inlet and the Pungnyuri-gang did not allow any great changes once B and A companies had failed to gain high ground from the Chinese south of the inlet. The south bank of the inlet from a point east of Hill 1250 and extending eastward up the Pungnyuri-gang to a point Soo yards beyond the causeway and bridge was the northern side of the perimeter. There, at its eastern extremity, a spur ridge from Hill 1456 came to the edge of the stream. It climbed from the river slightly east of south toward the rounded crest of Hill 1456. The lower reach of this ridge was gentler in incline than higher up, where it was sharply steep as it neared the crest. The 3rd Battalion (I and K companies combined all the remaining infantry) held the lower part of this spur ridge, which formed the eastern side of the perimeter for a distance of about 8oo to i,ooo yards. From that point the slope of the ridge became steeper, as did all the mountainside westward, and it could not be included in the perimeter. Enemy forces held the higher ground.

  The lower ground just south of the inlet was an uneven, semilevel, elongated area sloping gradually northward down to the inlet's edge. This stretch of ground became narrower as it extended westward. An erosional drainage draw ended this western low ground at the eastern base of Hill 1250. The draw was the west border of the perimeter. The perimeter in general outline resembled a bow with the bowstring drawn taut. If an arrow had been fitted to the bowstring, its flight would have been southward. The road and railroad at the north could be considered the taut bowstring of the perimeter.

  The horizontal dimension of the perimeter could hardly have been more than 1,400 yards wide, with the deepest part at its eastern end no more than 8oo yards. From there its depth gradually decreased as it extended westward, until it was no more than 300 to 400 yards deep. The western boundary of the perimeter was just in front (east) of the draw on the east side of Hill 125o and the spur ridge that ran down to the railroad and the vehicular road.

  Task Force Faith's troop disposition along the perimeter was as follows: beginning at the northeast corner of the perimeter, the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, held the line from the river's edge up the spur ridge. A remnant of L Company under Capt. William W. Etchemendy, now part of a consolidated K Company, apparently held the lower part of this line where it met the boundary of C Company at the river. Captain Kitz still commanded K Company, including the L Company remnant that had been consolidated with it. Above K Company Captain Marr's I Company carried the line to its upper and southern limit, where it met B Company, 32nd Infantry. From this point, the boundary of I and B companies (and of the 1st and 3rd battalions), the 1st Battalion was responsible for the remainder of the perimeter. Captain Turner's B Company carried the line westward along the lower slope of Hill 1456, following the 1,16o-meter contour line f
or perhaps Boo yards. A Company then picked up the line and carried it in a curve down to the railroad and road, where it met the C Company boundary. From there, just east of the drainage draw near Hill 1250, C Company had the line along the inlet to a point about Soo yards east of the bridge. There it met the beginning of the 3rd Battalion line and closed the perimeter.

  The C Company portion of the perimeter, less than a mile long, was the longest section held by any of the rifle companies, but it was also the most easily defended, with the inlet to its front. The boundary between A and C companies at the road at the western end of the perimeter was perhaps the single most important defensive point of the perimeter. A Company was responsible for the road there, but throughout the battles of the perimeter C Company helped in its defense. In effect it became a joint responsibility.

  Within the perimeter the 3rd Battalion command post remained in the hut near the bridge. Captain Jordan's M Company, the weapons company for the 3rd Battalion, remained in its initial position, which it never had lost, just behind the I Company infantry. Major Miller, who now commanded the 1st Battalion in a delegation of command Faith made when he assumed the role of Task Force commander, had a new improvised CP near the western end of the perimeter. Faith's Task Force CP and that of the 57th FA were about in the middle of the perimeter area, where they had always been-Faith's in the cave hole in the side of one of the railroad cuts. Captain Bigger's Weapons Company was behind (north of) A and B companies. Faith ordered a platoon-size force of D Company to be kept uncommitted as a task-force reserve. While there were eight Io5-mm howitzers within the perimeter, only four of them were now operational. Most of the heavy mortars were in the center of the perimeter. The antiaircraft weapons did not change location; they remained in a circle around the artillery and as a group were capable of firing in any direction with their revolving turrets.46