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  From their position in the flat ground at the mortars members of the column could see the A Company rear guard moving downhill toward them from the northwest. They could also see a Chinese force following closely. First Lieutenant Robert Reynolds, platoon leader of the 32nd Heavy Mortar Company's 4.2-inch mortars, hurriedly set up two of them. He first set them to fire over the heads of A Company into the Chinese. Then he fired some rounds over the crest of the hill. This caused the Chinese there to run over the crest toward A Company. He immediately set to fire shorter, putting the rounds on the enemy troops, causing heavy casualties.

  A Company came on, relatively free from pursuing Chinese. All the firing should have alerted everyone that the company was approaching. Despite this, a machine gun with the column opened up, but someone quickly stopped it. The gun then shifted its fire to a group of Chinese far in the rear of A Company.7 When A Company joined the battalion, the battalion's rear vehicles were a mile from the inlet. Major Miller said that he had had no real trouble in the rearguard withdrawal, even though Chinese followed closely, blowing "weird calls on their bugles."8

  During this stop the column reorganized to incorporate the heavy mortars and A Company. The leading vehicles were not far from the inlet. MacLean and Faith went ahead with a small party to reconnoiter the approach to the 3rd Battalion perimeter. They discovered a roadblock of logs on the south side of the bridge, covered by enemy automatic and small-arms fire. Faith kept the column stopped where it was and ordered some infantrymen to climb the hill to the east above the bridge to attack the enemy roadblock from above it.

  When these orders were given, Lieutenant Campbell, at the heavy-mortar position with the halted column, asked permission to take a machine-gun section and a 75-mm recoilless rifle to the high ground of Hill 1324, east of the road, to give supporting fire to help reduce the roadblock. He and his men started to climb the western slope of the hill, well north of the inlet. In his climb he did not encounter any other American troops on the high ground, so he knew that they must be farther east on the hill.

  Above the I,20o-meter contour line on this long spur ridge above the mouth of the inlet, Campbell had an excellent view of the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, perimeter below and saw the havoc the enemy had caused within it, especially in the artillery positions. He saw fighting still in progress in the southwestern part of the perimeter and enemy troops moving southwest on the road west of the perimeter. He saw and heard some artillery pieces within the perimeter still firing, the explosions of the propelling charges and detonations on impact almost simultaneous, indicating close direct fire. But he could not see the enemy roadblock or the bridge and causeway from his position, since folds of ground on the mountain blocked the view to the southeast.

  Campbell did try a few rounds of 75-mm recoilless-rifle fire and longrange machine-gun fire on the Chinese he could see at the southwestern edge of the perimeter, but the range was too great. He then heard the convoy on the road below begin to move, so he took his men and weapons down the finger ridge, which offered easy access to the road. Arriving at the road, he crossed the frozen inlet from a point near the mouth of the inlet in a long slant in a southeasterly direction to a point on the south side within the 3rd Battalion perimeter. At that time there were no vehicles on the road where he crossed it.,

  On the high ground east of the road and north of the inlet parts of B and C companies were screening the left flank of the road column and moving toward the inlet along the high spur ridges of Hill 1324. Before Sergeant Luna's party of B Company on Hill 1324 reached the overlook site north of the inlet, a runner brought word from Lieutenant Colonel Faith that they were not to cross the inlet on the ice. Luna was told that there was a 25- to 3o-foot drop to the ice, that there was a log roadblock at the causeway, and that enemy fire covered the entire causeway approaching the bridge.10

  Somewhat higher on the hill, east of Luna's group, Lieutenant Mortrude led two platoons of C Company southward on the high ground of Hill 1324 toward the inlet. He describes his route, which had changed abruptly when Faith had earlier shouted an order to him to climb higher on the hill in proceeding southward:

  This we did without enemy resistance but with much slipping and sliding around in our shoe pacs and overshoes on the hillside. After a mile or so, we were hailed by our Battalion Commander, Lt. Col. Faith. Upon identifying me by voice, he shouted for me to lead my column over the high ground and attack the enemy roadblock down in the valley beyond the turn of the road ahead of us while he hit it frontally. After a much longer, slower climb than I had anticipated, we finally gained a high, snow covered ridgeline. Here there were numerous prepared but abandoned positions. From the "C" rations scattered about (but too frozen to eat) we assumed these positions must have been previously occupied by US troops, perhaps the Marines. Well after daylight, we reached a position high above the enemy roadblock overlooking the frozen arm of the reservoir and the 31st Regimental positions. I formed the two platoons with me as skirmishers with orders to initiate marching fire on my command. However, just as we broke out of our attack position over the final military crest, Col. Faith's troops attacked down the road below and seized the road block with seeming ease. Perhaps the enemy had also detecked our impending "vertical envelopment" and lost some of their resolve in the face of being "pinchered.""

  Just how the logs at the southern end of the bridge were removed and how the enemy positions covering the roadblock by fire were neutralized is a bit uncertain. These tasks were probably carried out by a small group of soldiers, with Faith among them, aided by artillery fire from within the 3rd Battalion perimeter. One observer wrote that "Lt Moore, 1st Bn A.P. Platoon Leader, got across and with about six men proceeded to knock out the enemy positions on both sides of the bridge."1z One must also consider the comment written at Hagaru-ri a few days after the event by First Sergeant Luna of B Company. He wrote that he and his party from B Company had reached the ridgeline of Hill 1324 above the inlet and had come down from the cliff above the road not far from the bridge. In descending, many men were bruised and injured and broke or lost weapons and ammunition. Luna implies that he and some of his men met Faith on the road near the bridge and that some of them, including himself, with Faith leading, got to the logs on the far side of the bridge. They removed the logs, according to Luna, before enemy fire drove them to cover on the west side of the bridge abutments. It is possible that Lieutenant Moore with some of his A&P Platoon were with Faith. Luna and a few B Company men may have joined Faith and Moore in the attack on the roadblock.13 Luna gave credit to some of the 1o5-mm howitzers inside the perimeter in delivering direct fire on enemy east of the bridge and giving them effective cover while they removed the logs.

  Faith told the B Company men now streaming off the ridge and others coming up the road from the west that they would have to cross the ice on the inlet below the bridge for it was too dangerous to use the bridge. Faith placed riflemen on the west side of the bridge abutments and behind the causeway to fire on enemy east of the bridge up the Pungnyuri-gang Valley to prevent them from seizing the bridge or establishing a strong fireblock of automatic fire near it.14

  Mortrude and his two platoons of C Company apparently were not far behind Luna and his men in reaching the road near the bridge. Mortrude wrote: "When we finally broke over the military crest [of Hill 1324] above the roadblock Col. Faith and his troops were already closing on it. We came directly down the hill and joined them. I do not recall seeing any friendly or enemy casualties at that junction as we paused under cover of the West Bank of the causeway awaiting placement in the new perimeter.... The numerous enemy KIA [killed in action] found later in our new position along the south shore of the inlet appeared to be the result of the larger caliber antiaircraft weapons."15

  During the reduction of the roadblock the convoy remained halted. Major Robbins went to Colonel MacLean's jeep and learned from the driver that MacLean was ahead making a reconnaissance of a reported roadblock that had caused the
command group to halt the column. Robbins went back to his jeep. Someone then shouted that the vehicles were to get off the road and disperse in an open area left (east) of the road. They did so, expecting a Chinese attack. Suddenly a squad of Chinese came double-timing around a bend in the road from the north, no more than "twenty feet from our nearest vehicle." Firing started at once, seemingly from everywhere. The startled Chinese turned and took to their heels, and soon all was quiet. 16

  Again, Robbins said, he walked forward toward the inlet to Colonel MacLean's jeep. He said, "This time his bodyguard and radio operator, who rarely left the colonel's side, were there looking concerned and talking excitedly among themselves. I was told that the colonel had not gone with the enveloping company toward the flank of the road block, but had gone boldly down the road directly towards the obstacle when last seen and had not returned."17

  The halted column at the bend of the road was about a mile from the causeway and bridge roadblock. While Robbins looked up the inlet to the bridge and waited there, Faith came up the road and told him that the men he could see were his troops holding the bridge and that the vehicles were to dash across it to the 3rd Battalion perimeter, although there were still some enemy and enemy fire nearby. The vehicles were to cross the bridge one at a time, for the roadway across the bridge was only one lane wide, and any stalled vehicle on the bridge would block it.18

  Faith then started the vehicular column forward, placing Major Jones at the mouth of the inlet to control movement from there. Major Miller was to take a place at the north end of the causeway where the road turned to cross the Pungnyuri-gang to the south side and into the 3rd Battalion perimeter. He was to send the vehicles across in a dash, one by one, and to prevent a jamming of traffic at that key point. Enemy small-arms fire still peppered the crossing area.

  The column moved up the inlet under this control, and under Miller's direction they got across, some unscathed, some hit but not immobilized. All crossed except two 2'h-ton ammunition trucks, whose drivers abandoned them on the north side of the causeway. Sergeant Charles Garrigus, assistant motor sergeant, ist Battalion, on his own initiative left the perimeter later in the day and drove both trucks inside, the second one under smallarms fire, an extremely heroic action.19

  The men of the 1st Battalion, first those of C and B companies, crossed the ice of the inlet below the bridge into the 3rd Battalion lines, some as early as 9:00 A.M. First Lieutenant Thomas J. Patton, of A Battery of the 57th FA, inside the perimeter, wrote: "At approximately ogoo hours we saw the first elements of the 1st Bn 32 RCT coming across the frozen part of the reservoir to join us. Lt. Col. Faith took charge of all the forces in our sector and reorganized the perimeter defense."20

  Lieutenant Campbell, who, as described earlier, descended from the point of Hill 1324 and crossed the inlet on a long slant into the 3rd Battalion perimeter, may have led the first group from the 1st Battalion into the inlet perimeter. Most of the members of the 1st Battalion were in the 3rd Battalion perimeter by 10:00 A.M., except for the vehicle drivers, the officers left on the north side to control the movement of the motor column, and Captain Stamford, who remained with his TACP near the mouth of the inlet on the north side to direct air strikes. It was early afternoon before all the vehicles had closed. The entire battalion crossing lasted from about 9:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M.

  Some accounts have Faith sending or leading parts of two companies across the ice in the early morning to attack Chinese still on the southern side of the inlet, killing many and driving the rest away. I do not believe that such an attack ever happened. Faith may have sent some troops across the inlet to the south side after the bridge roadblock was removed to determine whether any enemy were on the south side at that point. The evi dence does not support the alleged attack. Both Major Jones and Captain Bigger say that Faith did not lead an attack across the inlet, although Jones says that he did send a force across to check out the situation. Captain Bigger, commenting on the alleged movement across the inlet says: "I recall no such attack taking place. I crossed the ice with Col. Faith and would have been in on it. We skirted the ice as unobtrusively as possible into the railroad cut where we began setting up a CP."21

  Lieutenant Mortrude and his two platoons of C Company were at the bridge and causeway. He says that he saw no attack, and his troops would likely have been involved had it been made. Lieutenant Campbell and Major Curtis, who were on the scene at the inlet early, say that they saw no attack. Captain Kitz, commanding K Company, 3rd Battalion, within the perimeter, saw the ist Battalion cross the inlet into the 3rd Battalion's perimeter but does not mention an attack. Nor did Lieutenant Patton, who saw the beginning of the crossing, mention an attack."

  That there were many Chinese dead in the area when the ist Battalion crossed the inlet on the morning of November 29 is true. But the evidence is strong that these Chinese had been killed during the night battle. Mortrude said that the dead were killed by antiaircraft weapons fire. Major Curtis noticed that the dead faced the 3rd Battalion perimeter, not the inlet, indicating that they died while attacking the perimeter and not facing an attack from across the inlet behind them. It is evident that there were no Chinese soldiers along the inlet when 1st Battalion troops crossed it and that the CCF troops who had been there when the 1st Battalion came into sight about dawn withdrew to the west along the road and railroad.

  Captain John D. Swenty, of the ist Battalion, provides a typical first impression of the 3rd Battalion perimeter when the ist Battalion men entered it. He wrote: "It was easy to see that their position was almost overrun. Within a small sector of their perimeter I counted over fifty (50) dead Chinese. All the dead had infiltrated to within ioo yards of the task force CP. Some even got within 25 yards of the

  Another first impression of the south side of the inlet was recorded by Captain Stamford, the FAC, who was near the head of the vehicular column. Two months later, he recorded his observations: "I observed troops across the finger of water moving south on the road and shoreline. They were carrying mortars and heavy MG's and on the hill I observed a mortar in the dawn.... I could get no permission to run strikes, because Colonel MacLean and Faith thought they were friendly, and before it got light enough to see well they both moved down the road with troops to reconnoiter a crossing to the 3/31."24 Later that morning Faith told Stamford to direct air strikes on the enemy mortar emplaced on Hill 1250 south of the inlet, which was registering on high ground north of the inlet. Faith also had Stamford run strikes behind A Company, the battalion rear guard with aircraft early on the scene. He then used all available aircraft to cover the troops crossing the ice west of the causeway and bridge. Afterward he shifted the strikes east of the causeway and bridge to suppress enemy fire there.25

  When the ist Battalion troops first saw the south side of the inlet, they looked at a battered battlefield. From Hill 1324 the view was panoramic. Major Curtis was one of many who approached the inlet from near the crest of the hill, descending a spur ridge running south. From this spur, where it dropped precipitously toward the inlet, he had a good view of the 3rd Battalion perimeter. He wrote:

  The "perimeter" of the 3/31 and 57th F.A. when I first saw it from the ridge line was a scene of destruction. It had been effectively "reduced" and was offering no organized resistance. There was smoke, fog, and very limited visibility. There was a sizable column of troops moving down the road to the southeast [Curtis subsequently corrected this to southwest] along what had been a part of the perimeter. I recognized them as Chinese troopsand assumed (correctly I think) that they were by-passing the perimeter and moving south since the perimeter had been reduced.26

  Campbell, who had viewed the scene below from near the same point, agreed with Curtis, saying that the 3rd Battalion area "appeared a scene of total devastation."

  Captain Bigger was with MacLean and Faith in the command group when it reached the inlet. He wrote of that moment:

  As our Bn Command Group arrived on the north side of the Inlet we cou
ld look across the ice and see that the 3rd Bn., 31 and 57 FA were heavily engaged. Chinese were pouring down the surrounding hill toward the perimeter of the units. The quad 50 machines guns and the dual 4o mm anti-aircraft weapons of the 57th FA were taking a heavy toll of the Chinese columns. It was like being a spectator at a large screen movie for a moment. It was about this time that we observed a column of troops approaching the perimeter of the 31st from the south along the road.27

  Colonel MacLean Disappears

  Colonel Allan Duart MacLean, 43 years old, commander of the 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, disappeared at the Pungnyuri-gang Inlet of Chosin Reservoir during the early morning of November 29, 1950. The Department of the Army carried him as missing for nearly three and a half years. Only on March 17, 1954, was he officially declared dead. What happened to him? Several eyewitnesses saw him crossing the frozen inlet a few minutes before he disappeared near the western edge. of the 3rd Battalion perimeter on the south side of the inlet. From then on, there was only silence.28 In the few months that Colonel MacLean commanded the 31st Infantry, he had acquired the reputation of being aggressive and perhaps a bit impulsive. Captain Robert E. Drake, commander of the 31st Tank Company, said that MacLean "was a very aggressive commander and wanted to be in the position as forward as possible."29

  At dawn on November 29 the command reconnaissance party had only a short distance to go from the halted motor column to reach the inlet, where the road turned east along the inlet toward the causeway and bridge. Visibility was still poor. Where the road turned east along its north bank, the inlet was Soo yards wide but narrowed to a small stream near the causeway and bridge. Along the stream were places where backup water from the reservoir had pushed into low ground on the south side, and there were marshy, brush-covered islands in the inlet. A few logs were also frozen in the ice.